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IPSE DIXIT: THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTSAND THE MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRACT LAW Gregory E. Maggs* 
I. Introduction Contracts casebooks often use a three-step approach in teaching legaldoctrines like consideration, offer and acceptance, or the statute of frauds.They first reprint a decision that applies the traditional rule that most courtsfollowed until the middle of this century.  Then, for contrast, they includeanother case that rejects the traditional approach in favor of a new andusually more flexible standard.  Finally, the casebooks quote a provisionfrom the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Contracts1(the “Restatement (Second)”) that adopts the more modern view. Professors E. Allan Farnsworth and William F. Young’s Cases andMaterials on Contracts,2  one of the most popular contracts casebooks,contains several examples of this pattern. For instance, in covering the topicof modification, the authors first reprint Arzani v. People.3  In that case, asubcontractor named Arzani agreed to pave a road for a general contractorfor a fixed price.4  When a labor dispute arose, Arzani told the generalcontractor he would need more money to complete the work.5  Although the
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6 See id.7 See id . 8 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941), reprinted in Farnsworth & Young, supra note 2, at357-61.9 See id . at 591 . 10 See id.11 See id . at 591 , 594. 12 See id. at 594.13 See Farnsworth & Young, supra note 2, at 353, 356. 14 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89 (1981).15 Id. § 89 reporter’s note. 16 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law130-34 (6th ed. 1996); Arthur Rosett, Contract Law and Its Application 240-65 (5 thed. 1994).
general contractor promised to pay Arzani an additional sum, the court heldthis promise unenforceable.6  The court explained that the generalcontractor had received nothing in exchange for his promise to pay moremoney because Arzani had a preexisting duty to complete the work and thatthe contractor’s promise therefore lacked consideration. 7*509 Immediately following the Arzani case, Farnsworth and Youngreprint a contrary decision called Watkins & Son v. Carrig.8  In that case,an excavator agreed to dig a cellar for a man named Carrig.9 The excavatorencountered unexpected bedrock and declared that it would need moremoney to complete the work.10  Carrig promised to pay the additionalamount requested, and the court held the promise enforceable.11  Refusingto apply the traditional preexisting duty rule relied on in Arzani, the courtconcluded that fairness required enforcement of the promise in view of theunforeseen difficulty of the work. 12In notes printed in connection with Arzani and Watkins, the authors citesection 89(a) of the Restatement (Second).13  Section 89(a) adopts theholding of Watkins, stating: “A promise modifying a duty under a contractnot fully performed on either side is binding. . . if the modification is fairand equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties whenthe contract was made.”14  The Reporter’s Note following section 89describes the section as “new” and cites Watkins as authority.15  Severalother leading casebooks cover the topic of modification using this samethree-step approach.16 Another example from the Farnsworth and Young casebook concernsthe ability of past services to serve as consideration.  The authors first
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17 20 M ass. (3 P ick.) 207  (1825), reprinted in Farnsworth & Young, supra note2, at 67 . 18 See id. at 207.19 See id . 20 See id . at 212 . 21 See id . at 211 . 22 See id. The court noted that the law traditionally had recognized exceptionsfor promises reaffirming debts discharged in bankruptcy, barred by the statute offrauds, or incurred as an infant. See id. at 209.23 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935), reprinted in Farnsworth & Young, supranote 2 , at 68-72. 24 See id. at 196-97.25 See id . at 197 . 26 See id. at 198.27 See id . 28 See Farnsworth & Young, supra note 2, at 73. 29 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §  86 (1981). 
reprint Mills v. Wyman.17  In that famous old case, a sailor fell ill and aman named Mills cared for him.18  Mills later notified the sailor’s father,Wyman, who promised to pay Mills for the services that he had rendered.19  The court, however, refused to enforce Wyman’s promise. 20 It explainedthat although the father may have had a moral duty to pay for the services,the father had received nothing in exchange for the promise because Millsalready had performed.21  This case illustrates the traditional rule that“past” or “moral” consideration generally cannot serve as a basis forenforcing promises. 22Following Mills v. Wyman, Farnsworth and Young include Webb v.McGowin. 23    In that more recent case, Webb saved McGowin’s life bydiverting *510 a falling piece of wood.24  To show his gratitude for thisservice and to compensate Webb for injuries that he had sustained,McGowin promised to pay Webb a small pension for the rest of his life.25The court enforced the promise even though Webb had not exchanged anynew consideration.26  The court concluded that Webb’s past action sufficedin the circumstances. 27In a note following these two cases, Farnsworth and Young cite section86 of the Restatement (Second), 28 which adopts the holding of Webb v.McGowin. Section 86 states: “A promise made in recognition of a benefitpreviously received by the promisor from the promisee is binding to theextent necessary to prevent injustice.”29  The Reporter’s Note to section 86describes the section as “new” and cites Webb v. McGowin (among other
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30 Id. § 86 reporter’s note.31 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Contracts: Cases and Doctrine 688-98 (1995);Steven J. Burton, Principles of Contract Law 191-99 (1995); Thomas D. Crandall& Douglas J. Whaley, Cases, Problems, and Materials on Contracts 204-15 (2d ed.1993); John P. Dawson et al., Cases and Comment on Contracts 233-47 (6th ed.1993); Fuller &  Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 170-79; Robert W. Hamilton et al.,Cases and Materials on Contracts 314-23 (2d ed. 1992); James F. Hogg & CarterG. Bishop, Contracts: Cases, Problems and Materials 180-97 (1997); Charles L.Knapp & N athan M. Crystal, Problems in Contract Law: Cases and Materials165-76 (3d ed. 1993); Edward J. Murphy et al., Studies in Contract Law 139-50(5th ed. 1997); Rosett, supra note 16, at 229-37; Robert E. Scott & D ouglas L.Leslie, Contract Law and Theory 193-201 (2d ed. 1993); Robert S. Summers &Robert A. Hillman, Contract and Related Obligation: Theory, Doctrine, andPractice 144-56 (3d ed. 1997). 32 Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 150(1969).
decisions) as authority.30  Numerous other casebooks reprint the samecases, followed by section 86, in discussing the topic of pastconsideration.31 This three-step approach to covering contracts doctrines has severalbenefits.  It demonstrates to first-year students that the law changes overtime.  It shows them the typical direction of change that has occurred in thetwentieth century.  It also informs students of the preferred view of theAmerican Law Institute and, therefore, presumably of the academy ingeneral. Yet, despite achieving these pedagogic objectives, the approach raisesa difficult issue.  After working through the pattern on one doctrine oranother, a student invariably will ask whether the new rule that is includedin the Restatement (Second) accurately reflects the current law, or insteadwhether most courts still apply the traditional rule.  This reasonablequestion usually does not have an easy answer. The American Law Institute’s decision to include a rule in the Restate-ment (Second) does not mean that a majority of courts have adopted thatrule.  The Restatement (Second) strives to state the best rules, notnecessarily the rules that most courts have followed.  As Professor HerbertWechsler stated in 1969 while serving as the Director of the American LawInstitute, “any statement that the law is such and such is more than anempiric finding that decisions have so held. . . .[ I]t implies a normativeassertion as to what *511 should now be held, if and when the question ispresented.”32  Professor Farnsworth, who served as one of the Reporters to
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33 E. Allan Farnsworth , Ingredients in the Redaction of the Restatement(Second) of Contracts, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1981) (internal citations omitted).34 Hamilton et al., supra note 31, at 7.35 Burton, supra note 31, at 11. 36 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15(1)(b) (1981) (“A person incursonly voidable contractual duties by entering into a transaction if by reason of mentalillness or defect...(b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to thetransaction and the other party has reason to know of his condition.”).
the Restatement (Second), similarly has explained that “often a paucity ofcases or a confusion in the courts’ analyses makes it impossible starkly tocontrast innovation with tradition.”33 Most contracts casebooks, for this reason, contain a disclaimer beforequoting from the Restatement (Second).  They typically caution studentsthat they cannot rely on the work as an accurate statement of the law.  Forexample, Professors Robert W. Hamilton, Alan Scott Rau, and Russell J.Weintraub warn in their textbook: “The Restatement provisions are usuallydrawn from case precedent, though they do not always reflect the ‘majority’view. Sometimes a Restatement provision sets forth what the Reporter andAdvisers think the rule should be even though there is little precedent forit.”34  Professor Steven J. Burton likewise explains in his casebook that thelaw in some jurisdictions may differ from the provisions of the Restatement(Second), but assures his readers that “the Restatement (Second). . . servesas a conventional statement of ‘the modern view’ of the law, even when itdiffers from the formal law on the books in a particular jurisdiction.”35 Disclaimers of this sort seem somewhat inadequate given the prominentrole of the Restatement (Second) throughout first-year contracts courses.Students cannot critically think about the legal system unless they have anaccurate understanding of what courts actually do.  Accordingly, they needclear guidance on when the Restatement (Second) reflects actual contractlaw and when it merely states a proposal that has not yet gone into practice.To address this problem, I recently undertook a survey to determine howcourts have received some of the modern rules in the Restatement (Second).My survey considered six important and innovative sections: * Section 15(1)(b), which states a new rule for determining when amental illness or defect makes a promise voidable;36
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37 See id. § 86(1) (“A promise made in recognition of a benefit previouslyreceived by the promisor from the promisee is binding to  the extent necessary toprevent injustice.”). 38 See id . § 87(2) (“An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect toinduce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offereebefore acceptance and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding asan option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice.”).39 See id . § 89(a) (“A promise modifying a duty under a contract no t fullyperformed on either side is binding (a) if the modification is fair and equitable inview of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract wasmade....”). 40 See id. § 139(1) (“A promise which the promisor should reasonably expectto induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person andwhich does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding theStatute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.The remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires.”).41 See id. § 153 (“W here a mistake of one party at the time a contract was madeas to a basic assumption on which he made the contract has a  material effect on theagreed exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the contract is voidable byhim if he does not bear the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in § 154, and (a)the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would beunconscionable, or (b) the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his faultcaused the mistake.”).42 Farnsworth and Young cite all of these rules in their casebook. See Farns-worth & Young, supra note 2, at 73, 257-58, 307, 333, 356-57, 801. Other contractscasebooks cite many of them. See, e.g., Fuller & Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 130,178-79, 409 , 699 (citing sections 86, 87(2), 89, and  153); Hamilton et al., supranote 31, at 298, 323, 476, 765, 894 (citing sections 15, 86, 87(2), 89, and 139);
* Section 86, which states a new rule for when past services may serveas a basis for enforcing promises; 37* Section 87(2), which states a new rule for when reliance can makean offer irrevocable;38 *512 * Section 89, which states a new rule on the enforceability of contractmodifications in view of unanticipated circumstances;39 * Section 139, which states a new rule on when reliance can make apromise enforceable notwithstanding the statute of frauds;40  and * Section 153, which states a new rule on when a unilateral mistakecan make a promise voidable.41 I analyzed these six sections because they typically arise in contractscasebooks used by students during their first year of law school.42 
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Rosett, supra note 16, at 119-20, 236, 264, 562 (citing sections 15, 86, 87, and 89).43 The American Law Institute adopted and promulgated the Restatement(Second) of Contracts at its annual meeting on May 17, 1979. Final publication ofthe work, however, did not occur until 1981. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts(1981). 44 See infra Appendix (listing cases).45 For a comparable study of how courts have responded to section 90, seeDaniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Lawand the “Invisib le Handshake,” 52 U . Chi. L. Rev. 903, 904, 907 (1985). 46 Restatement of Contracts (1932).47 See infra Part III.B. 48 See O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1897)(“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and no thing more pretentious,are what I mean by the law.”).49 See infra Part V. 
The study had an uncomplicated methodology.  Almost thirty-five yearshave passed since the American Law Institute began work on the Restate-ment of Contracts in 1963, and more than fifteen years have passed sinceit published these rules in their final form in 1981.43  During this time, 241cases from a wide variety of jurisdictions have cited these six sections.44In conducting the survey, I simply read all of these cases. 45The survey produced surprising results.  Although the six sectionscontradicted long-standing traditional rules--including black letter rules thatappeared in the original Restatement of Contracts46  (the “Restatement”)published in 1932--courts almost universally accepted them. Only eightdecisions rejected or criticized the rules.47  The other cases cited the rulesfavorably when applying them or discussing them in dicta. The study does not answer the nagging question about whether theRestatement (Second) accurately states the law in most jurisdictions, but ittakes *513 an important first step. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famouslydefined the law as merely a prediction about what a court will do whenpresented with particular facts.48 Under that definition, the new rules insections 15(1)(b), 86(1), 87(2), 89(a), 139, and 153 certainly come close tothe status of law. In view of the overwhelming support for these provisionsto date, it is reasonable to predict that most courts will follow them in thefuture.49 Although I initially had sought to determine only how courts hadreceived these new rules in the Restatement (Second), I observed anunexpected phenomenon in reading the cases. In particular, most courtssimply deferred to the new rules. In the vast majority of cases, courts gave
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50 See Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organiza-tion for the Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an AmericanLaw Institute, reprinted in American Law Institute, The American Law Insti-tute--50th Anniversary 5, 12 (1973) [hereinafter Report].51 See id . at 15-19. 52 See id. at 20-25 (discussing, specifically, the need for a restatement of thelaw).
no reasons for their decisions to embrace the six sections. They simplycited them as they would cite a statute or code and did not question theirauthority. This practice raises an important normative question: Should courtsfollow the Restatement (Second) as readily as they currently do?  ThisArticle seeks to address that policy issue in addition to describing thesurvey.  It concludes that, although some arguments counsel againstdeference to an academic work such as the Restatement (Second), onbalance, the practice does more good than harm.  By deferring to theRestatement (Second), courts have tended to promote uniformity andcertainty in the law of contracts and to conserve judicial resources.Although deference to the Restatement (Second) may alter the substanceof the law in some jurisdictions, such changes generally do not havedeleterious consequences. The remainder of this Article consists of four parts.  Part II describes thedevelopment of the Restatement and its successor, the Restatement(Second).  Part III describes the survey and shows the extent to whichcourts have followed the six new rules.  Part IV evaluates the propriety ofjudicial deference to the Restatement (Second).  Part V concludes bypredicting that even more decisions will support the new rules in the future.II. The Restatement of Contracts In the early 1920s, at the invitation of the American Association of LawSchools, a group of prominent judges, legal scholars, and practicingattorneys formed the “Committee on the Establishment of a PermanentOrganization for the Improvement of the Law.”50  This committee preparedan influential report faulting the American legal system for its uncertaintyand complexity.51    The report proposed creating an institute that wouldundertake projects to address these problems.52 *514 In 1923, in response to the report’s recommendation, Chief JusticeWilliam Howard Taft, former Secretary of State Elihu Root, and othersformed a nonprofit organization called the American Law Institute
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53 See Restatement of Contracts at vii (1932); American Law Institute, About theAmerican Law Institute (visited  Sept. 1, 1997) <http:// www.ali.org/ali/thisali.htm>.54 The ALI has two kinds of members. The “official members” include SupremeCourt Justices, Chief Justices of state courts of last resort, and various barassociation figures. The “elected members” include respected attorneys, judges, andlaw professors. See Restatement of Contracts at vii-viii; American Law Institute,supra note 53.55 See Restatement of Contracts at xi-xii. 56 See id. at ix.57 See id. at ix, xi. For additional history on the creation of the Restatement, seeNote, What Price Certainty? Corbin, Williston, and the Restatement of Contracts,70 B .U. L. Rev. 511, 516-22 (1990). 58 See Restatement of Contracts at xvii-xli (listing the sections).59 See, e.g., id. § 492 & cmt. (defining duress, explaining the definition, andproviding illustrations) . 60 Id. at xi-xii.61 See G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph ofModernist Jurisprudence, 15 Law & Hist. Rev. 1, 23 (1997). 
(“ALI”).53  Over the past seventy years, the ALI has enjoyed a membershipof some of the most prominent lawyers, judges, and law professors in thenation.54    In accordance with its founding objective, the ALI has under-taken numerous projects designed to improve the law, including thecreation of the Restatement and the Restatement (Second). A. The Restatement of Contracts In its first year of existence, the ALI decided that expert authoritiesshould examine the common law precedents in several areas of the law andreduce them to a clear set of rules that lawyers and judges could follow.55With funding from the Carnegie Corporation and the leadership ofProfessor Samuel Williston, it undertook work on the subject of contracts.56In 1932, after nine years of collaborative effort, the ALI completed andpublished the two-volume Restatement.57 The Restatement contains a total of 609 sections addressing differentcontract law doctrines.58  Each section contains a concisely stated rule oflaw followed by an explanatory comment, which often includes illustra-tions.59  The sections do not provide citations justifying the rules; instead,the ALI simply asserted that “[t]he accuracy of the statements of law maderests on the authority of the Institute.”60 In compiling the Restatement, the ALI sought to state existing commonlaw rules in clear and simple terms.  It did not desire to create new rules. 61  Although the authors of the Restatement occasionally had to choose
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62 Restatement of Contracts at xi.63 Id. at xiv. 64 See id . § 90 (“A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect toinduce action or forbearance of a  definite and substantial character on the part ofthe promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding ifinjustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”). The Restatementgives the following example: “A promises B  not to foreclose for a specified time,a mortgage which A ho lds on B’s land. B thereafter makes improvements on theland. A’s promise is binding.” Id. § 90 illus. 1.65 See, e .g., Commonwealth v. Scituate Sav. Bank, 137 Mass. 301, 302 (1884)(Holmes, J.) (“It would cut up the doctrine  of consideration by the roo ts, if apromisee could  make a gratuitous promise binding by subsequently acting onreliance on it.”) . 66 See James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 547, 566-68 (1995)(discussing the history of the decision to include section 90).67 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 281 (1952). 68 For early commentary on the Restatement, see, for example, Charles E. Clark,The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 Yale L.J. 643 (1933); George W.Goble, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 21 Cal. L. Rev. 421 (1933);Harold C. Havighurst, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 27 Ill. L. Rev. 910(1933); Charles E. Hughes, Restatement of Contracts Is Published by the AmericanLaw Institute, 18 A.B.A. J. 775 (1932); Edwin W. Patterson, The Restatement ofthe Law of Contracts, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 397 (1933); and Clarke B. W hittier, The
among “very numerous and sometimes conflicting” cases,62  they believedthat their work reflected mainstream views. ALI Director William DraperLewis accordingly proclaimed that “there is reason to expect that theRestatement of this and other subjects will be accepted by the courts andlegal profession *515 generally as prima facie a correct statement of whatmay be termed the general common law of the United States.”63 The effort to state rules sometimes required creativity.  For instance, inthe often-cited section 90, the Restatement declared that a court mayenforce a promise upon which the promisee has relied, even in the absenceof consideration.64  This provision contradicted judicial opinions holdingthat reliance on a promise alone could not justify its enforcement.65  TheALI, however, decided to include section 90 because courts often hadfound ways to protect parties who relied on promises even if courts did notexplicitly acknowledge reliance as a basis for enforcement.66  ProfessorArthur L. Corbin, who participated in drafting the Restatement, explained:“It is the belief of the present writer that the court decisions compel theinclusion of some such rule as that adopted by the Institute, and that thegenerally prevailing law never was inconsistent with it.”67 The Restatementproduced a mixed reaction upon its publication. 68    Most scholars praised
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Restatement of Contracts and Consideration, 18 Cal. L. Rev. 611 (1930).69 See Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 1  (summarizing early reaction to theRestatement). 70 See W hite, supra note 61, at 36 (“In review after review of the earlyRestatements critics demonstrated their disaffinity with the jurisprudentialassumptions guiding the project.”).71 See id . 72 See 1979  Annual Report, 56 A.L.I. Proc. 560 (1980) (noting that 12,580 caseshad cited the Restatement by 1979, the year in which the ALI adopted andpromulgated its successor, the Restatement (Second)).73 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at vii (1981). 74 See id.75 See id.; see also supra note 43 (discussing the completion date of theRestatement (Second)).76 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at ix-xxii (listing the sections).77 See, e.g., id. § 175 & cmt. & illus. (stating when duress by threat makes acontract voidable); see also supra note 59 and accompanying text (providing anexample of this organization in the Restatement). 78 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 reporter’s note.
the work for its impressive scope and careful construction.69  Yet, manywriters also faulted it because they did not believe that common lawdoctrines lent themselves to summary in simple black letter rules.70  Lawprofessors also criticized the failure of the ALI to offer citations to supportthe rules.71  Despite these academic objections, the Restatement took thejudiciary by storm. Courts relied on the work heavily and ultimately citedits rules in over twelve thousand cases.72    The ALI had sought to influencejudges and probably could not have hoped for more success. *516 B. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts In 1962, with funding from the A.W. Mellon Educational and CharitableTrust, the ALI began work on a revised version of the Restatement calledthe Restatement (Second).73  Professor Robert Braucher served as theReporter until 1971;74  Professor E. Allan Farnsworth succeeded him andserved as Reporter until completion of the project in 1981.75  The Restate-ment (Second) contains 385 sections, considerably fewer than its predeces-sor.76  This reduction reflects an effort to condense and combine relatedsections. As in the Restatement, the sections in the Restatement (Second)each state a black letter rule and then have comments explaining the ruleand giving illustrations.77  Unlike the first Restatement, every section of theRestatement (Second) contains a “Reporter’s Note.”78  These notes
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79 See Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 4 (discussing the creation of the “reporter’snotes”). 80 Restatement (Second) of Contracts at vii.81 See W hite, supra note 61, at 46; supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 82 See supra note 61 and  accompanying text.83 Wechsler, supra  note 32, at 150. 84 See Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 5-7.85 See infra Part III.B. (discussing each of these provisions in depth). 86 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §  15 reporter’s note (1981); id. § 87reporter’s note; id. § 89 reporter’s note; id. § 139 reporter’s note; id. § 153reporter’s note.87 See, e .g., id. § 15 reporter’s note (relying on numerous law review articles andother legal publications). 
typically list cases that support or, in some instances, contradict thesection’s rules, comments, and illustrations.79 The ALI officially explained its motivation for revising the originalRestatement by saying that changes in the law mandated “periodicreexamination and revision.”80  Professor White, however, argues that theALI had a more specific reason for wanting a new version of the work. Inparticular, he contends that the ALI found the original Restatementintellectually inadequate in view of the scholarly criticism describedabove.81 Whatever the impetus for the revision, most writers would agreethat the Restatement (Second) rests on a different philosophy from theRestatement. In the first publication, the ALI sought only to clarify the lawand not to change it.82    The ALI, for this reason, generally avoidedincluding new or controversial rules.  The Restatement (Second) differsconsiderably in this regard. The drafters of the Restatement (Second) did not seek merely to staterules that courts in a majority of jurisdictions had adopted.  They soughtinstead to express a “normative” view about what rules courts shouldapply.83  In many instances, they chose rules that had little support at thetime, but that further policies the ALI considers important.84  Sections15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89, 139, and 153 all would appear to fall into thiscategory.85  The Reporter’s Notes describe these sections as “new” becausethey state rules that *517 did not appear in the Restatement.86  These notesgenerally contain few citations to cases, but instead rely heavily onacademic commentary as authority.87 This shift in philosophy apparently has not lessened the ALI’s influenceon the judiciary.  A total of over twenty-four thousand cases now have cited
IPSE DIXIT 13
88 See 74 A.L.I. Ann. Rep. 25 (1997).89 See infra Part III.B. 90 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at app. 6 (1982), app. 7 (1986), app.8 (1990), app. 9 (1993), & app . 10 (1997).91 Shepard’s Restatement of the Law Citations (3d ed. 1994 & app. Mar. 1997).92 See, e .g., Quigley v. W ilson, 474 N.W.2d 277, 281 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991)(citing section 89); Bragdon v. Drew, 658 A.2d 666, 668-69 (M e. 1995) (citingsection 15). 
the Restatement and the Restatement (Second).88  Moreover, courtsgenerally have followed the new rules in the Restatement (Second) eventhough they differ from traditional rules.89III. Judicial Reception of New Rules in the Restatement (Second) ofContracts To determine how courts received the new rules in sections 15(1)(b), 86,87(2), 89, and 139, I examined all of the cases that have cited them.  Thefollowing discussion first explains the methodology of the survey.  It thenreports the number of cases that have cited each of the sections favorablyand unfavorably.  Finally, it describes the reasons for courts’ generalacceptance of the new rules. A. Survey Methodology I obtained lists of cases citing the six new rules from two sources.  First,I gathered all of the citations included in the 1982, 1986, 1990, 1993, and1997 appendices to the Restatement (Second).90  These appendices striveto list all judicial decisions that have cited the Restatement (Second) in itsfinal published form or in earlier circulated drafts. Second, I collected allof the citations of the six sections included in the 1994 main volume andthe March 1997 appendix of Shepard’s Restatement of the Law Citations.91Several factors required researching both sources.  Unlike the appendi-ces to the Restatement (Second), Shepard’s does not include cases thatcited preliminary versions of the six sections that appeared in publisheddrafts before 1979.  The Shepard’s appendix, however, contains somerecent citations that have not yet been published in a Restatement (Second)appendix.  In addition, each source lists a few cases that the other shouldinclude but, for some unknown reason, does not; some citations in theappendices do not appear in Shepard’s, 92 and some citations in Shepard’s
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93 See, e.g., Strata Prod. Co. v. Mercury Exploration Co., 916 P.2d 822, 829(N.M . 1996) (citing section 87); Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Group, P.C., 519N.Y.S.2d 973, 978 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (Sandler, J., concurring) (citing section15). 94 This count requires four qualifications. First, this figure includes a few casesin which only a concurring or dissenting opinion cited  one of the sections. See, e.g.,In re Estate of Obermeier, 540 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (W eiss,J., dissenting) (citing section 15). The following discussion singles out most of thesecases for special treatment. Second, in the rare instance that a case discussed morethan one of the six sections, the case was counted once for each section cited. Forexample, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 293 S.E.2d 749, 755-56, 759(N.C. 1982), was counted as two cases because it cited both sections 89 and 139.Third, superior and inferior court decisions were counted as separate cases. Forinstance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Estate of McGovern v.Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 526-27 (Pa. 1986), and the PennsylvaniaCommonwealth Court’s decision in Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 481A.2d 981 , 984-86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984), were counted as two cases. Fourth, thisfigure does not include cases that erroneously cited one of the six sections when thecourt apparently intended to refer to some other provision. See, e.g., Altevogt v.Brinkoetter, 421 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 1981) (citing section 139, but apparentlyreferring to some other provision). 95 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 4.6, at 240 (2d ed. 1990); 1 SamuelWilliston, The Law of Contracts § 256, at 500 (1929). 
do not appear in the appendices.93  Looking at both sources thus provideda method of double-checking my research. *518 B. The New Rules and Their Reception A total of 241 cases cited the six new rules contained in sections15(1)(b), 86, 87, 89, 139, and 153.94 Of these cases, only eight rejected therules or otherwise referred to them negatively. The other 233 adopted andapplied the rules or at least cited them favorably in dicta. The followingparagraphs discuss each of these sections and the results of the survey inmore detail. 1. Section 15(1)(b) Contract law allows a person to void a promise that he or she madewhile lacking mental capacity.  Courts traditionally have judged a person’smental capacity by examining the person’s ability to understand thepromise. 95    Section 15(1)(a) of the Restatement (Second) retains thisstandard, permitting a party to void a promise if “he [wa]s unable tounderstand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the
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96 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15(1)(a) (1981).97 Id. § 15(1)(b). 98 250  N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969). 99 See id . at 461-62. 100 Id. at 464.101 See id. at 465 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 18C (TentativeDraft No. 1, 1964)). In a somewhat circular manner, the reporter’s note to the finalversion of section 15(1)(b) cites Ortelere for support. See Restatement (Second) ofContracts §  15 reporter’s note. 102 See Ortelere, 250 N.E.2d at 464 (“Once it is understood that, acceptingplaintiff’s proof, Mrs. Ortelere was psychotic and because of that psychosis couldhave been incapable of making a voluntary selection of her retirement systembenefits, there is an issue that a modern jurisprudence should  not exclude, merelybecause her mind could pass a ‘cognition’ test based on nineteenth centurypsychology.”).
transaction.”96  Section 15(1)(b), however, now includes an alternative testthat allows a person to void a promise if “he [wa]s unable to act in areasonable manner in relation to the transaction and the other party ha[d]reason to know of his condition.”97  Under the alternative rule, the person’sability to understand the promise does not matter. Many casebooks teach the new alternative using Ortelere v. Teachers’Retirement Board.98  In that case, a woman named Ortelere exercised anoption under her retirement plan while suffering from cerebral arterioscle-rosis.99  The New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that New Yorkcases previously had relied on a cognitive test of understanding todetermine mental capacity, but decided to update the law based on what itconsidered *519 advances in “psychiatric knowledge.”100  At the time of thedecision, the ALI had not yet published the Restatement (Second), but ithad circulated preliminary drafts. The Court of Appeals cited and followeda draft version of what is now section 15(1)(b),101  explaining that even ifOrtelere could understand the transaction, she might not have been able toact in a reasonable manner.102 
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103 See infra Appendix. The citations came from federal courts within the First,Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, and from local courts in Alaska, the District ofColumbia, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, andWisconsin. Some of these cases cited section 15 generally, without singling outsubsection(1)(b). Two cases, both from New York, cited section 15 only in dissent.See In re Estate of Obermeier, 540 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)(Weiss, J., dissenting); Tomasino v. New York State Emp. Ret. Sys., 448 N.Y.S.2d819, 822 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (Weiss, J., dissenting), aff’d, 440 N.E.2d 1300(N.Y. 1982). The majority opinions in these two cases, however, did not reject therule in section 15(1)(b), which the New York courts have followed since Ortelere.See, e.g., Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Group, P.C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976 (N.Y. App.Div. 1987) (implicitly adopting section 15(1)(b) by holding that contracts arevoidable if one party suffers from psychosis about which the other party knew orshould have known). 104 481 A.2d 981, 984-86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984), rev’d, 517 A.2d 523 (Pa.1986).105 517 A.2d 523, 526 (Pa. 1986) (“This Court has never adopted Section 15 ofthe Restatement, which requires a post--hoc determination of reasonableness, andwe decline to  do so  now.”). 106 See id. at 530 (Larsen, J., dissenting) (“I would adopt the principles set forthin the Restatement of the Law of Contract Second, § 15, apply those principles tothis case, and affirm the Commonwealth Court.”).107 See Corbin, supra  note 67, § 230, at 321; Farnsworth, supra note 95, § 2.8,at 54, 57-58; 1 W illiston, supra note 95, §§ 142, 148, at 317-19, 329-31. Forcategories that traditionally were excluded from this rule, see supra note 22. 
The survey found twenty-two cases citing section 15.103  Only one ofthese cases cited the provision in a negative manner. In Estate of McGovernv. Commonwealth State Employees’ Retirement Board,104  the trial courtfollowed the new rule in section 15(1)(b), but the Pennsylvania SupremeCourt reversed and simply stated that the rule did not reflect Pennsylvanialaw.105    A vigorous dissent, however, urged adoption of section15(1)(b).106 2. Section 86 Traditional statements of contract law reject the concept of “past” or“moral” consideration. They say that a promisor does not have to keep apromise merely because the promisor, prior to making the promise,received something from the promisee.107  Unless the promisor bargainedfor the benefit*520 from the promisee, a court cannot find consideration
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108 See Restatement of Contracts § 75 cmt. b (1932) (stating the traditional rulethat “[c]onsideration must actually be bargained for as the exchange for thepromise”).109 See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text. 110 See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.111 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 86(1) (1981). For further discussion ofsection 86, see Steve Thel & Edward Yorio, The Promissory Basis of PastConsideration, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1058-67 (1992) (describing the developmentof section 86). See also Gordley, supra note 66, at 597-98 (presenting an interestingtheory of the nature of the  injustice suffered in a case covered by section 86). 112 See infra Appendix. These cases came from a federal district court in Kansas,and from state courts in Arizona, California, and Missouri. See infra Appendix; seealso Graves v. Sawyer, 588 S.W .2d 542, 544 (Tenn. 1979) (citing section 86 butapparently intending to refer to some other provision).113 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 47 (stating the rule for “Revocationof Divisible Offer”). 114 See Corbin, supra note 67, § 31, at 50; Farnsworth, supra note 95, § 3.25, at199; 1 Williston, supra note 95, § 55, at 94.115 333  P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) (in banc). 116 See id. at 758.
and cannot enforce the promise.108  The Mills v. Wyman case illustrates thistraditional view.109 The Restatement (Second) creates an exception to the traditional rule.Adopting the approach used in Webb v. McGowin,110  section 86 states: “Apromise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by thepromisor from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to preventinjustice.”111    The survey found four cases citing section 86.112  All ofthese cases treated the rule favorably. 3. Section 87(2) A person who makes an offer generally can revoke it at any time priorto acceptance unless he or she has entered into a binding contract (calledan “option contract”) to keep the offer open.113  Traditional statements ofcontract law say that an offeror can form a binding option contract only bypromising to keep the offer open and receiving consideration for thepromise.114    The requirements of a promise and consideration, however,may produce hardship because sometimes an offeree relies on an offer evenif the offeror has not bargained to keep it open. Many casebooks illustrate this potential hardship with Drennan v. StarPaving Co.115  In that case, a subcontractor made an offer to a generalcontractor to do some paving work for a fixed price.116  The general
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117 See id . 118 See id. at 758-59.119 See Farnsworth, supra note 95, § 3.25, at 199 (noting that, under “traditionalcontract doctrine,” a subcontractor could revoke an offer “in spite of reliance by thegeneral contractor,” and explaining that the California Supreme Court “made adramatic departure from this traditional analysis” in Drennan). 120 See id. § 4.21, at 287 (explaining but questioning this logic).121 See D rennan, 333 P.2d at 760. 122 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87 reporter’s note (1981) (citingDrennan). For further discussion of section 87(2), see Avery Katz, When Shouldan Offer Stick? T he Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotia-tions, 105 Yale L.J. 1249, 1261-66 (1996) (discussing the development of section87(2)), and Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Prolifera-tion of Promissory Estoppel, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 52, 62-67 (1981) (same).123 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §  87(2). 
contractor relied on this offer in preparing a bid.117  After the generalcontractor submitted the bid and obtained the contract, the subcontractorattempted to withdraw its offer, and the general contractor could not findanyone else to do the work for the same price.118  Under traditionally statedprinciples of contract law, the subcontractor could have revoked theoffer.119  Because the subcontractor*521 had not promised to keep the offeropen, no option contract existed.120  In an opinion by Justice Roger Traynor,however, the California Supreme Court rejected this position and held thatan offeror cannot revoke an offer if the offeror knew that the offeree wouldrely on it.121 The Restatement (Second) adopts the rule in Drennan as an exceptionto the traditional view that an offeror remains free to revoke an offer absenta bargain to keep the offer open.122  Section 87(2) states: “An offer whichthe offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of asubstantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and whichdoes induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract tothe extent necessary to avoid injustice.”123  Under this section, reliance onan offer may create an option contract that precludes revocation even if theofferor has not promised to keep the offer open. 
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124 See infra Appendix. The citations came from federal courts within the D .C.,Second, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, and from the U.S. Court of Claims, andfrom state courts in Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, NewYork, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Some of these cases cited section 87generally, without singling out subsection (2). Cases that cited only section 87(1)or its predecessors were not counted. See, e.g., Lewis v. Fletcher, 617 P.2d 834,836 (Idaho 1980) (citing the tentative draft of section 87); Johnson v. Norton Hous.Auth., 375 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (M ass. 1978) (same). One New York case citedsection 87(2) in dissent, see Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245,1251 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen, J., dissenting), but the majority opinion did not reject therule. See id. at 1246-48. The New York Court of Appeals has cited the rulefavorably. See De Kovessey v. Coronet Properties Co., 508 N.E.2d 652, 655 (N.Y.1987).125400 N.E.2d 1314  (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).126 Id. at 1315.127 674  A.2d  521  (Md. 1996). 128 See id. at 529-30.129 See id . at 531-32. 130 See supra notes 3-12 and accompanying text. 
The survey found twenty-one cases citing section 87(2).124  None of thecases rejected section 87(2) or otherwise referred to it in a negative manner.Two cases, although not unfavorable, stood out as somewhat unusual. InPearl v. Merchants-Warren National Bank,125  the Appeals Court ofMassachusetts cited a draft version of section 87(2) to support theproposition that “[a]n option given without consideration is revocable atany time by the offeror.”126  This citation seems a little odd because section87(2) creates an exception to that rule. In Pavel Enterprises, Inc. v. A.S.Johnson Co.,127  the Court of Appeals of Maryland cited section 87(2) andaccepted the idea that reliance can make an offer binding.128  Yet, the courtanalyzed the issue primarily under the general promissory estoppel rule insection 90 rather than the specific rule for offers in section 87(2).129    Thisdecision also seems peculiar because offers are not promises. *522 4. Section 89 As described above in the discussion of Arzani and Watkins, one partyto a contract sometimes encounters unforeseen circumstances when thetime for performance arrives.130  For example, a contractor may faceincreased labor costs, or an excavator may discover hidden bedrock. Inthese cases, the other party might promise to pay more money or consentto change the specifications in order to obtain the previously agreed uponperformance. 
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131 See Corbin, supra note 67, §  184 , at 265-66; Farnsworth, supra note 95, §4.21 , at 287 ; 3 Williston, supra note 95, § 130, at 275-76. 132 See Corbin, supra note 67, § 184, at 265-66; Farnsworth, supra note 95, §4.21 at 287; 3 Williston, supra note 95, § 130, at 276.133 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §  73 (1981). 134 Id. § 89. For further discussion of the development of section 89, see Knapp,supra note 122, at 71-76 (discussing the history of the inclusion of the provision),and Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the BargainPrinciple, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1123, 1184-87 (1986) (same). See also Robert A.Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67Cornell L. Rev. 680, 692-702 (1982) (criticizing section 89 for lack of clarity andunderinclusiveness). 135 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89. 
Traditional statements of contract doctrine say that these subsequentpromises lack consideration.131 The party making the promise, the logicruns, is not receiving anything in exchange because the other party has apreexisting duty to perform.132  The Restatement (Second) retains this rulein section 73, which states: “Performance of a legal duty to a promisorwhich is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consider-ation.”133 The Restatement (Second), however, contains a new section based onWatkins that sometimes makes this kind of subsequent promise enforceableeven if it lacks consideration.  Section 89 provides: A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performedon either side is binding (a) if the modification is fair and equitablein view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when thecontract was made; or (b) to the extent provided by statute; or (c)to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of materialchange of position in reliance on the promise.134 Under section 89,if a party encounters unexpected difficulties, the other party does nothave to promise to pay more money or to change the specifications.Yet, if the other party does make such a promise, courts will enforceit if enforcement would be “fair and equitable” in view of thecircumstances or, in some instances, if the aggrieved party relied onthe promise.135  The aggrieved party’s preexisting duty to performwould not matter. 
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136 See infra Appendix. These cases came from federal courts within the D .C.,First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, and state courts in Connecticut,Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, New Hampshire, NewYork, Ohio , Rhode Island, and W yoming. Two cases cited section 89 only indissent, but the majority opinions in these cases d id not reject the rule. See Scholzv. Montgomery W ard & Co., 468 N.W .2d 845, 854 (M ich. 1991) (Levin, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part); Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen, J., dissenting).137 293  S.E.2d 749 (N.C. 1982). 138 Id. at 755 (emphasis omitted).139 Id. 140 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90.141 See Farnsworth, supra note 95, § 2.19, at 92 , 95-96. 142 Courts previously had allowed parties to use equitable (as opposed topromissory) estoppel to preclude defendants from denying that they had signed asufficient writing. See id. § 6.12, at 454-55 (contrasting equitable and promissoryestoppel); 1 Williston, supra note 95, § 98, at 187 (discussing estoppel in general).143 220  P.2d 737 (Cal. 1950) (in banc). 
The survey found twenty-one cases citing section 89.136  Only one casecited section 89 in a negative or, at least, potentially negative way. InWachovia*523 Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish,137  the North CarolinaSupreme Court stated the traditional preexisting duty rule as follows: “[A]nagreement to waive a substantial right or privilege, thus altering the termsof the original contract, must be supported by additional consideration, oran estoppel must be shown.”138  After this statement, the court included thefollowing citation: “But see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89 (1981)(modification of executory contract needs no consideration if fair andequitable in light of unanticipated circumstances or if allowed by statute orif detrimental reliance).”139  The “but see” signal makes the court’s positionon section 89 difficult to determine. The signal may imply that the courtdoes not agree with the rule in section 89, but wants to acknowledge theexistence of contrary authority. Alternatively, the signal may indicate thatthe court recognizes an exception to the general rule that it has stated. 5. Section 139 Section 90, as described above, adopts promissory estoppel as a basisfor enforcing contracts.140 When courts first began to use the rule stated insection 90, they saw reliance as a substitute for consideration. 141 Somelitigants, however, sought to use promissory estoppel to enforce unwrittenpromises falling within the statute of frauds.142  In the leading case ofMonarco v. Lo Greco,143  however, Justice Roger Traynor writing for the
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144 See id. at 740-41.145 See John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts §§ 19-48,at 842 & n.61 (3d ed. 1987); see also Knapp, supra note 122, at 67-71 (describingthe development of section 139 and  the change that it made in the law). 146 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(1) (1981).147 See infra Appendix. The cases came from federal courts within the  First,Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, N inth, and Tenth circuits, and from statecourts in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Y ork, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas,Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The count does not includeone case that cited section 139, but apparently meant to refer to another section. SeeAltevogt v. Brinkoetter, 421 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 1981). One case from Michigancited section 139 only in dissent. See Powers v. Peoples Community Hosp. Auth.,465 N.W.2d 566, 567  (Mich. 1991) (Levin, J., dissenting). The followingdiscussion describes the Michigan case in detail. See infra notes 154-156 andaccompanying text. 148 See Josephs v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. Pa.1989) (rejecting section 139 on the basis of Polka v. May, 118 A.2d 154, 156 (Pa.1955)), aff’d mem., 899 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1990); Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Kopani,514 N.E.2d 840, 844-45 (Ind . Ct. App. 1987) (generally rejecting section 139);Greaves v. Medical Imaging Sys., Inc., 879 P.2d 276, 283 (Wash. 1994) (generallyrejecting section 139); Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co., 635 P.2d 103, 103, 107(Wash. 1981) (rejecting section 139 in a case involving section 2-201 of the UCC).
California Supreme Court accepted this argument, enforcing an unwrittenpromise on grounds that the promisee had relied.144 In drafting the Restatement (Second), the ALI adopted the approach ofcases like Monarco and concluded that courts should have the power to usepromissory estoppel to overcome the statute of frauds.145  Section 139(1)states: A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induceaction or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third personand which does induce the action or forbearance is enforceablenotwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided*524 only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted forbreach is to be limited as justice requires.146The survey found eighty-four cases citing section 139.147  Six of thesecases cited section 139 negatively. Of these six cases, four categoricallyrejected the provision; a federal district court applying Pennsylvania law,the Washington Supreme Court (in a pair of cases), and the Indiana Courtof Appeals all concluded that reliance could not overcome the statute offrauds in any circumstance.148  The Maine Supreme Court also rejected
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149 See Stearns v. Emery-Waterhouse Co., 596 A.2d 72, 74-75 (M e. 1991)(“[W]e decline [plaintiff’s] invitation to accept promissory estoppel as permittingavoidance of the statute in employment contracts that require longer than one yearto perform. Although section 139 of the Restatement may promote justice in othersituations, in the employment context it contravenes the policy of the Statute toprevent fraud. It is too easy for a disgruntled former employee to allege reliance ona promise, but difficult factually to distinguish such reliance from the ordinarypreparations that attend any new employment.” (emphasis omitted)). 150 See McCoy v. Spelman Mem’l Hosp., 845 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Mo. Ct. App.1993) (distinguishing the employment relationship from other contractualrelationships).151 See infra Part IV.A.1. 152 See Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Rosenthalv. Kingsley, 674 F. Supp. 1113, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Klein v. Jamor Purveyors,Inc., 489 N.Y.S.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); D & N Boening, Inc. v. KirschBeverages, Inc., 471 N.Y.S.2d 299, 302 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 472 N.E.2d 992, 996(N.Y. 1984); Swerdloff v. Mobil Oil Corp., 427 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (N.Y. App. Div.1980).153 See Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1130 n.6 (Me. 1978); Berg v.Ting, 886  P.2d 564, 573-74 (Wash. 1995) (en banc); Family Med. Bldg., Inc. v.Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 702 P.2d 459, 462-63 (Wash. 1985) (en banc);Lectus, Inc. v. Rainier Nat’l Bank, 647 P.2d 1001, 1001-02 (Wash. 1982) (enbanc); Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 616 P.2d 644, 648  (Wash.1980) (en banc); see also Tiegs v. Boise Cascade Corp., 922 P.2d 115, 122-23(Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the Washington Supreme Court rejected section139 in Lige and Greaves, but distinguishing those decisions in a case involving partperformance), rev. granted , 936 P.2d 416 (W ash. 1997). 
section 139 in the employment context without deciding its applicability inother contexts. 149 The Missouri Court of Appeals similarly suggested thatsection 139 should not apply in employment cases.150    As explained morefully below, these courts mostly reasoned that judges could not makeexceptions to a statute (i.e., the statute of frauds) in a common lawmanner.151 A number of other decisions also deserve mention, although they did notcite section 139 negatively.  Five federal and state cases applying NewYork law cited section 139 in a generally favorable manner, but held thata plaintiff seeking to overcome the statute of frauds also must show thatfailure to enforce a promise would produce an “unconscionable” injury.152In a sense, these courts have added an element to section 139. Six otherdecisions (five applying Washington law and one applying Maine law)expressly declined*525 to adopt or reject section 139.153  One dissentingopinion cited section 139 favorably in circumstances suggesting that the
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154 See Powers v. Peoples Community Hosp. Auth., 455 N.W.2d 371, 373-74(Mich. Ct. App. 1990).155 Powers v. Peoples Community Hosp. Auth., 465 N .W.2d 566, 566 (Mich.1991). 156 See id. at 566 (Levin, J., dissenting from denial of leave to appeal).157 See Farnsworth, supra note 95, § 9.4, at 693; 3 Williston, supra note 95,§ 1578, at 2792. 158 Restatement of Contracts § 503 (1932).159 Id. § 472(1)(b). 160 Id. § 472(2).161 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §  153  reporter’s note (1981). 
majority did not accept the rule. In that case, the Michigan Court ofAppeals held that the statute of frauds barred enforcement of an oralpromise without considering section 139.154  The Michigan Supreme Courtdenied leave to appeal.155  A dissent from the denial, however, asserted thatthe Court of Appeals should have considered the section.156 6. Section 153 Occasionally, after two parties form a contract, one of them will realizethat he or she made a mistake and will not want to perform.  For example,a subcontractor might offer to do work for fifty thousand dollars, but laterdiscover that, because of a mathematical error, it should not have offeredless than seventy-five thousand dollars.  Traditional statements of contractdoctrine generally do not recognize a unilateral mistake as a defense tononperformance or ground for rescission.157  Section 503 of the firstRestatement, for instance, said that “[a] mistake of only one party thatforms the basis on which he enters into a transaction does not of itselfrender the transaction voidable.”158 The traditional rule that unilateral mistakes do not make a contractvoidable has an exception for mistakes caused by the other party’s failureto disclose the facts.  Section 472(1)(b) of the first Restatement said:“There is no privilege of non-disclosure, by a party who. . . knows that theother party is acting under a mistake as to undisclosed material facts.”159Section 472(2) then made clear that “[w]here non-disclosure is notprivileged it has the effect of a material misrepresentation”160 and accord-ingly may justify rescission of the contract. The drafters of the Restatement (Second) decided to “liberalize][“ theexception to the traditional rule that a unilateral mistake does not make acontract voidable.161  Section 153 now provides: 
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162 Id. § 153.163 Id. 164 Id.165 See infra Appendix. The cases came from the United States Supreme Court,the United States Claims Court and Court of Federal Claims, and from other federalcourts within every circuit but the First Circuit and Federal Circuit. They also camefrom local courts in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, theDistrict of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts,Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Five of these casescited section 153  only in dissenting opinions, but the majority opinions in thesecases did no t reject the rule stated by the section. See Middle E. Banking Co. v.State St. Bank Int’l, 821 F.2d 897, 910 (2d Cir. 1987) (Mahoney, C.J., concurringin part & dissenting in part); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 235 n.14(D.C. Cir. 1982) (Greene, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Waggoner v.Waggoner, 383 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (Karns, J., dissenting), aff’d,398 N.E.2d 5, 9 (Ill. 1979) (citing tentative draft); Alperin v. Eastern Smelting &Ref. Corp., 591 N.E.2d 1122, 1131 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (Fine, J., dissenting);Cortesi v. R & D Constr. Corp., 524 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff’d,534  N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1988). 
*526 Where a mistake of one party at the time a contract was madeas to a basic assumption on which he made the contract has amaterial effect on the agreed exchange of performances that isadverse to him, the contract is voidable by him if he does not bearthe risk of the mistake under the rule stated in § 154, and(a) the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of thecontract would be unconscionable, or(b) the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his faultcaused the mistake.162Section 153 changes the traditional doctrine stated in the originalRestatement in two ways.  First, a unilateral mistake can render a contractvoidable if “enforcement of [such] contract would be unconscionable”whether or not the nonmistaken party had a duty of disclosure.163  Second,a unilateral mistake can render a contract voidable if the nonmistaken partyhad “reason to know of the mistake,” even if he or she did not have actualknowledge of the mistake.164 The survey found eighty-nine cases citing section 153.165  None of thesecases rejected section 153 or cited it in a negative manner. Three cases,however, found the elements of the section unsatisfied without deciding
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166 See In re Conservatorship of Estate of O’Connor, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386,398-99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Da Silva v. Musso, 428 N.E.2d 382, 386-87 (N.Y.1981); Erickson by Wightman v. Gundersen, 515 N.W.2d 293, 299-300 (Wis. Ct.App. 1994) (noting that no Wisconsin case had adopted the rule but findingelements unsatisfied).167 See Warren v. Greenfield, 595 A.2d 1308, 1312-13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).The court said that “unilateral mistakes will not void a contract.”   Id. at 1313. Itthen cited comment (a) to section 153, which explains that “[courts are] reluctantto allow a party to avoid  a contract on the  ground of mistake, even as to a basicassumption, if the mistake was not shared by the other party.” Id. at 1313 n.4(quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 cmt. a) (internal quotation marksomitted). 
whether to adopt the section as the governing law.166  One case oddly citedsection 153 in support of the proposition that unilateral mistakes cannotvoid a contract.167 *527 C. Why Courts Have Favored the New Rules Why did so many courts decide to follow these six sections even thoughthey state new rules of contract law?  Although some of the cases surveyedoffered explanations for their acceptance, the vast majority did not.  Mostcourts simply cited the new rules and applied them without comment.  Theprecise reasons that the rules have caught on, as a result, necessarily remaina matter of some speculation. Careful consideration of the cases, however, suggests four explanationsfor the favorable reception of the new rules in sections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2),89, 139, and 153. First, a few courts appear to have followed the rules ongrounds of precedent. Second, a few other courts appear to have followedthe new rules for policy reasons. Third, several other courts adopted therules because statutes or case law require them to follow the Restatement(Second) absent contrary authority. Fourth, the remaining courts appear tohave accepted the rules on grounds of convenience; rather than examineprecedent or policy arguments, courts voluntarily deferred to the ALI’sview of what the law should be. The following discussion describes eachof these four reasons for the success of the new rules. 1. Precedent The foregoing portion of this Article describes the six rules in sections15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89, 139, and 153 as new because the rules contradicttraditional statements of contract doctrine. The adjective “new,” however,requires some qualification. In two types of situations the rules may not
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168 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15 reporter’s note (citing Ortelerev. Teachers’ Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) and other cases); id. §86 reporter’s note (citing Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) and othercases); id. § 87 reporter’s note (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757(Cal. 1958) and other cases); id. § 89 reporter’s note (citing Watkins & Son v.Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941) and other cases); id. § 139 reporter’s note (citingMcIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970) and other cases); id. § 153reporter’s note (citing Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d713 (Cal. 1960) and other cases).169 See id . § 139. 170 220 P.2d 737, 740-41 (Cal. 1950) (in banc). See Paul T. W agerin, Damagesfor Reliance Across the Spectrum of Law: Of Blind Men and Legal Elephants, 72Iowa L. Rev. 47, 77 n.220 (1986) (“The substantive principle  of Monarco is nowenshrined in § 139....”).
have appeared novel to courts that applied them. On the contrary, courtsmay have felt bound by applicable precedent to follow them. First, in a few instances courts may have felt compelled to follow therules because their jurisdictions already had adopted essentially the samerules prior to the publication of the Restatement (Second).  Despite thegeneral novelty of the six rules considered, the ALI actually did not inventthem; indeed the Reporter’s Notes for each of the six sections cite at leasta few cases supporting the rules.168  As a result, some courts that followedthe sections may have felt that precedent compelled their decisions. Consider, for example, section 139.  This section states what I havecharacterized as a “new” rule on using promissory estoppel to overcome thestatute of frauds.169  The rule, however, is not entirely novel. The CaliforniaSupreme Court in fact adopted essentially the same rule in 1950 inMonarco v. Lo Greco.170 Accordingly, when courts in California citesection 139, they *528 are not really adopting a new rule. Instead, theysimply are citing a secondary source that restates preexisting Californialaw. The Monarco precedent requires them to follow the rule. In conducting the survey, I found it difficult to determine exactly howmany of the 241 cases that cited the new rules could have relied instead onprecedent.  Most decisions, as noted, simply did not give reasons.  Yet,probably only a few cases followed the rules because they reflectedpreexisting precedents; the Reporter’s Notes themselves confirm that only
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171 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15 reporter’s note; id. § 86reporter’s note; id. § 87 reporter’s note; id. § 89 reporter’s note; id. §  139  reporter’snote; id . § 153 reporter’s note. 172 See supra notes 98-102 and  accompanying text.173 See O rtelere, 250 N .E.2d at 465. 174 See infra Appendix (organizing cases by jurisdiction).175 670  P.2d 764 (Colo. 1983) (en banc). 176 See id. at 767-70.177 Id. at 770. 178 See id. at 769.179 The New York Court of Appeals carefully considered the policy argumentsfor the new rule in section 15(1)(b) in Ortelere. See 250 N.E.2d at 465. 180 See, e.g., McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Washington Capital Dus, Inc., 66F.3d 89, 94 (5th Cir.) (describing section 89 as an “appropriate exception to thepreexisting duty rule”), opinion corrected on denial of reh’g, 70 F.3d 26 (5 th Cir.1995); Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v. HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112, 116 (4th Cir.
a handful of jurisdictions actually had adopted the rules prior to publicationof the Restatement (Second).171 Second, in other instances courts may have felt compelled to follow thenew rules because of precedent arising after the ALI formulated the rules.For example, in Ortelere described above,172  the New York Court ofAppeals cited and adopted the rule in section 15(1)(b).173  At the time ofthat decision, the rule had little or no support in the cases and could beconsidered a new rule. Subsequent New York cases, however, must treatthe Ortelere decision as precedent. As a result, when lower courts in NewYork now cite section 15(1)(b), they no longer really are adopting a newrule. For this reason, the number of jurisdictions that have adopted the rulesin some respects provides a better gauge of the ALI’s influence than thenumber of cases that have cited them favorably.174 2. Policy Although some courts may have approved the new rules on grounds ofprecedent, others based their decisions on policy grounds.  For example, theColorado Supreme Court in Kiely v. St. Germain175 carefully considered thepolicies behind both the statute of frauds and the doctrine of promissoryestoppel. 176 It concluded that the legislature would want courts to “utilizea balancing test to prevent use of the statute [of frauds] to effect inequitableresults.”177  It thus decided to follow section 139.178 The survey, however, found few decisions even remotely similar toKiely. 179    Several courts described a new rule with a favorable adjective,such as “appropriate” or, ironically, “mainstream.”180 Most courts, however,
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1983) (identifying section 153 as the “mainstream of judicial decisions”).181 The comments to sections 15, 86 , 89, and 153 briefly state the rationalesbehind the rules in a single paragraph. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15cmt. a (1981); id. § 86 cmt. b; id. § 89 cmt. a; id. § 153 cmt. a. The comments tosections 87 and 139 explain the elements of the rules, but do not state  theirrationale. See id. § 87 cmts. a-e; id. § 139 cmts. b-d. 182 V.I. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 4 (1996).
simply*529 cited the new rules from the Restatement (Second) withoutcomment. The opinions in these cases did not indicate that the courts hadany views about the substance of the rules. True, some courts may have decided to follow the rules for policyreasons even if they did not discuss those reasons.  Yet, this practiceprobably did not occur often.  The notes and illustrations in the Restate-ment (Second) strive to explain the rules, but usually say little about theirrationale.181  Working through all of the policy arguments for the ruleswould require some effort, and courts undertaking that effort in a seriousfashion in most instances probably would say something about it in theiropinions. 3. Mandated Deference A couple of courts involved in the survey followed the new rules in theRestatement (Second) for reasons unrelated to precedent or the policyarguments in favor of the rules.  Instead they adopted the rules becausestatutes or case law in their jurisdictions require courts to defer to the ALI’svarious Restatements.  In these rare instances, the Restatement (Second)acts something like a code of contract law. Legislation in the Virgin Islands, for example, makes all of the ALI’sRestatements binding unless contradicted by other law.  The Virgin IslandsCode provides: The rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements of thelaw approved by the American Law Institute, and to the extent notso expressed, as generally understood and applied in the UnitedStates, shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the VirginIslands in cases to which they apply, in the absence of local laws tothe contrary.182Pursuant to this statute, courts generally must defer to the Restatement(Second).  In the survey, one court applying Virgin Islands law felt
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183 See Billman v. V. I. Equities Corp., 743 F.2d  1021, 1024 & n.3 (3d  Cir.1984) (following section 89).184 See Bank of Am. v. J. & S. Auto Repairs, 694 P.2d 246, 248 (Ariz. 1985)(“In the absence of contrary authority Arizona courts follow the Restatement of theLaw.”).185 See, e.g., L.K. Comstock & Co. v. United Eng’rs & Constructors, Inc., 880F.2d 219, 223 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1989) (following Restatement (Second) based onArizona precedent requiring courts to defer to it). 186 See United States v. Brown, 763 F. Supp. 1518, 1526 (D. Ariz. 1991) (citingsection 153 with approval), aff’d, 979 F.2d 1380, 1380 (9th Cir. 1992); AMERCOv. Shoen, 907 P .2d 536, 541  (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (same); Hill--Shafer Partnershipv. Chilson Family Trust, 784 P.2d 691, 698 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (same), vacated,799 P.2d 810  (Ariz. 1990) (en banc); Realty Assocs. v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 738 P.2d1121, 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 86 with approval); Hill v. Jones,725 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing secTion 153 with approval).187 911 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Neb. 1995), aff’d, 105 F.3d 412, 414 (8th Cir. 1997).188 See id. at 1268.189 See, e .g., Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205,1209-10 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993) (in banc) (noting that Pennsylvania courts frequentlyfollow the Restatement).
compelled by this statute to adopt the new rule on the modification ofcontracts stated in section 89.183 In other jurisdictions, judicial decisions sometimes require courts todefer to the ALI.  For instance, the Arizona Supreme Court has decreed thatArizona courts will follow the Restatements absent contrary authority. 184Lower Arizona courts and federal courts sitting in diversity accordinglymust defer to rules in the Restatement (Second) when no statute orprecedent requires*530 otherwise.185  Five cases involved in the survey fallwithin this category.186 Even if no decision expressly requires courts to defer to the Restatement(Second), a widespread practice may create such a policy.  For instance, inAcme Investment, Inc. v. Southwest Tracor, Inc.,187  a federal district courtin a diversity case decided to follow section 238 (a provision not consid-ered in the survey) because it observed that Nebraska courts often hadfollowed other provisions of the Restatement (Second).188 Courts have usedsimilar reasoning in other jurisdictions.189 4. Convenience In a few of the cases involved in the survey, courts indicated that theywere accepting the new rules because of precedent, policy considerations,or laws requiring them to follow the Restatements.  In most of the cases,
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190 42 N.E.2d 808 (M ass. 1942).191 See id . at 809 . 192 See id. at 808.193 See id . at 809 . 194 Id. at 808-09.195 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153  (1981). 
however, courts did not say anything about why they were adopting thenew rules.  They simply cited the new rules and applied them much as theywould cite and apply a governing statute.  Courts did not explain why theywere relying on the Restatement (Second), or critically analyze the rulesthat they were applying. Courts in these cases undoubtedly knew that the ALI has no authorityto make law and that courts may disagree with the Restatement (Second).Most courts also probably knew that not all jurisdictions agree with everyrule in the Restatement (Second).  So why did courts simply look up therules and apply them?  My hypothesis is convenience.  By deferring to theRestatement (Second), courts avoided the difficulty of analyzing precedentor weighing policy arguments. Consider, for example, how the Massachusetts courts have receivedsection 153 on unilateral mistakes.  In 1942, in Swinton v. WhitinsvilleSavings Bank,190  the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected theidea that a unilateral mistake could make a contract voidable.191  In thatcase, a bank sold a house to a purchaser without disclosing that the househad termite damage.192  The court refused to rescind the transaction despitethe purchaser’s*531 mistaken belief that the house contained no damage.193  The court explained that the bank had no duty to disclose, stating: The law has not yet, we believe, reached the point of imposing uponthe frailties of human nature a standard so idealistic as this.  That theparticular case here stated by the plaintiff possesses a certain appealto the moral sense is scarcely to be denied. . . . But the law cannotprovide special rules for termites and can hardly attempt to deter-mine liability according to the varying probabilities of the existenceand discovery of different possible defects in the subjects of trade.The rule of nonliability for bare nondisclosure has been stated andfollowed by this court in [numerous cases cited].194Section 153 rejects the result of Swinton.  If a court applied section 153to the facts of the Swinton case, the court would rescind the sale of thehouse.  The court would conclude that, under the circumstances, theunilateral mistake of the purchaser would make the contract voidable.195  A
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196 See id. § 161 reporter’s note cmt. d.197 504  N.E.2d 664 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987). 198 See id. at 667.199 See Torrao v. Cox, 525  N.E.2d 1349, 1352 (M ass. App. Ct. 1988); Covichv. Chambers, 397 N.E.2d 1115 , 1121 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
Reporter’s Note in the Restatement (Second) confirms this analysis byciting Swinton as contrary authority.196 In light of this background, litigants might have expected the SupremeJudicial Court of Massachusetts to reject section 153 as contrary to itsprecedent.  In First Safety Fund National Bank v. Friel,197  however, thecourt simply cited and applied section 153 without recognizing that itconflicts with Swinton.198  The Appeals Court of Massachusetts has actedsimilarly in two other cases.199  The courts in these three cases appear tohave deferred to the Restatement (Second) simply on grounds of conve-nience. Researching the black letter rules requires less effort than siftingthrough fifty years of precedent. Deference based on convenience has become so common that thepractice now attracts little attention.  Courts apparently do not see a needto explain the reason for what they are doing.  As a consequence, theRestatement (Second) now has extraordinary influence on the law. IV. Propriety of Judicial Deference The survey revealed that a large number of courts have followed thenew rules stated in sections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89, 139, and 153 of theRestatement (Second). Most of these courts appear to have accepted thenew rules on grounds of convenience and not because either precedent orcareful considerations of policy mandated their acceptance. Theseobservations raise an important policy question: Should courts defer soreadily to a nonbinding *532 secondary source like the Restatement(Second) in formulating common law rules? The following discussion considers this question, addressing potentiallegal and policy objections.  It concludes that on balance the practiceappears not only lawful, but also more beneficial than harmful.  Deferenceto the Restatement (Second) generally adds clarity and uniformity to thelaw and conserves judicial resources.  A contrary conclusion would castdoubt on both the competence of the hundreds of courts that have deferredto the ALI’s rules and the concept of a restatement of contract law. A. Possible Legal Objections 
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200 See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78Geo. L.J. 281, 283-94 (1989) (discussing the topic of legislative supremacy indepth). The general principle that statutes take precedence over the common lawhas exceptions. For example, prior common law decisions may continue toinfluence the interpretation of statutes in a variety of ways. See Earl Maltz, TheNature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 367, 386-87 (1988); Honorable Roger J.Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 Cath. U. L. Rev. 401, 402(1968).201 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 14 cmt. a (noting that the commonlaw age of majority was 21, but that nearly all states have lowered the age to 18 bylegislation).
It is not easy to find a legal objection to the way that courts haveadopted the new rules in the Restatement (Second).  Most states have givencourts the power to develop the rules of contract law in a common lawmanner.  Pursuant to this power, courts at one time developed the tradi-tional rules that existed prior to the middle of this century.  Also pursuantto this power, it stands to reason, courts should be able to modify the rulesas they deem appropriate.  In some cases, that power to modify may meanadopting the new rules included in sections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89, 139,and 153 of the Restatement (Second). Courts and commentators, nonetheless, have expressed two potentialobjections to judicial deference to the ALI.  First, although courts have thepower to develop new common law rules, they do not have the power tocontradict legislation.  Second, even if courts have the power to make newrules of contract law, they cannot delegate this power to the ALI.  Thefollowing discussion addresses these arguments but ultimately concludesthat neither has much force in the present context. 1. Supremacy of Legislation over the Common Law Legislation generally takes precedence over common law rules,200including the common law rules that govern contracts. For example, if thestate legislature passes a law that says eighteen year-olds have the capacityto form nonvoidable contracts, a court could not retain a common law rulesetting the age of majority at twenty-one.201  On the contrary, the courtwould have to follow the legislation. Any other result would place courtsahead of state legislatures in the formation of the law. In most states, the supremacy of legislation would not affect adoptionof the rules contained in sections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), or 153 of theRestatement (Second).  These sections address subjects usually left to thecommon law. *533 Few states have statutes defining the test for mental
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202 U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1995); see also id. § 2A-208(1) (implementing the samerule for leases of goods).203 See id . § 2-102 (defining the scope of the Article). 204 An official comment suggests that courts should not enforce modificationsmade in bad faith. See id. § 2-209 cmt. 2. A person who requests a modificationwhen circumstances have not changed may be acting in bad faith. See id. In sucha case, section 89 and section 2-209 might provide the same result.205 635  P.2d 103 (W ash. 1981) (en banc). 206 See id. at 103.207 See id . at 107 . 
incapacity, the validity of moral consideration, the consequences of relianceon offers, or the rules regarding unilateral mistakes. Instead, statesgenerally have allowed courts to make rules in these areas, as they havedone for most of contracts law. Section 89 differs somewhat. Almost all states have passed statutesgoverning the modification of contracts. Section 2-209(1) of the UniformCommercial Code (the “U.C.C.”), in particular, provides: “An agreementmodifying a contract within this Article [i.e., Article 2 governing sales ofgoods] needs no consideration to be binding.”202  A court could not adopta common law rule contradicting this provision. Two factors, however,limit the extent to which section 2-209(1) of the U.C.C. conflicts withsection 89 of the Restatement (Second). First, section 2-209(1) applies onlyto transactions in goods.203  Courts therefore still can adopt section 89 as acommon law governing other types of contracts. Second, sections 89 and2-209(1) resemble each other very closely. Both sections weaken thetraditional preexisting duty rule, permitting courts to enforce modificationseven if no new consideration supports them. Section 2-209(1) merelyexceeds section 89 by not requiring (or at least not explicitly requiring) achange of circumstances to justify the modification.204 Section 139 presents a greater challenge to the principle of legislativesupremacy.  When courts adopt section 139, they arguably are contradictinglegislation.  Section 139, as described above, creates an exception to astatute--the statute of frauds.  This section allows courts to enforceunwritten promises that the statute indicates they should not enforce.  Forthis reason, several courts specifically have refused to adopt section 139.For example, in Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co.,205  a litigant sought touse section 139 to overcome the statute of frauds in section 2-201 of theU.C.C.206  The Supreme Court of Washington rejected the argument,concluding that enforcing an unwritten promise based on promissoryestoppel would contradict the statute.207  This position, although not
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208 See Kiely v. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764 , 770 (Colo. 1983) (en banc). Inadopting section 139 , the court relied on section 1-103 of the U.C.C., whichprovides: “Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principlesof law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity tocontract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement itsprovisions.” U.C.C. § 1-103.209 See Farnsworth, supra note 95, § 6.1, at 395 (explaining how the statute offrauds “has been the subject of constant erosion” by the courts). 210 See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 101 (1982).
universally accepted, has much to say for it. Courts certainly have no dutyto adopt the positions taken by the ALI and may decline to adopt themwhen they think that they would run afoul of legislation. Despite this reasoning, however, courts still might find adoption ofsection 139--or other provisions touching upon subjects covered by astatute-- permissible for two reasons.  First, state legislatures may havedelegated to courts the power to balance competing interests in interpretingstatutes.  The Supreme Court of Colorado, for instance, found that the statelegislature had *534 taken this approach in the U.C.C.208  Indeed, in manycases, courts reasonably can assume that legislatures expect them to createcommon law exceptions to the statute of frauds because courts have beentinkering with statutes of frauds for many years.209 Second, the principles of legislative supremacy may vary from state tostate.210  Although the law in some jurisdictions may not permit judges tocreate exceptions to statutes, it may allow the practice in others. Indeed,some courts’ adoption of section 139 demonstrates this possibility. Thesecourts have the power to determine what is legal and what is not, and theyevidently have not seen a problem with creating an exception to the statuteof frauds. 2. Improper Delegation Even if courts generally have the power to make common law rules,they still face some limits on how they exercise that power.  Judges, forexample, cannot allow bribes to influence their decisions.  They also cannotrender decisions when they have a conflict of interest.  A question thusarises whether judges legitimately are exercising their lawmaking authorityif they simply defer to the Restatement (Second). 
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211 See Paul A. Simmons, Government by an Unaccountable Private Non ProfitCorporation, 10 N.Y.L. Sch. J . Hum. Rts. 67 , 71-72 (1992). 212 Id. at 89.213 See id . at 71. 214 See id. at 89-90.215 The Arizona Supreme Court, as noted, has directed lower courts to follow therule in the Restatement (Second) absent contrary authority. See supra Part II.C.2.The court, however, did not commit itself always to follow the rules. See supra PartII.C.2. 216 See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 488 A.2d 581, 593 (Pa.1985) (Hutchinson, J., concurring) (citing section 87).217 See Estate  of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 526-27 (Pa.1986) (rejecting section 15(1)(b)).
Judge Paul A. Simmons forcefully has asserted that courts have gone toofar in their solicitude to the Restatements.211  He contends that “the courtsof this nation have surrendered to the ALI their inherent common lawjudicial power to state, restate, and reformulate the legal principles thatmust be used and applied by courts in the course of litigating various casesand controversies in this nation’s judicial system.”212 Judge Simmonsmaintains that this delegation of lawmaking authority from courts to theALI violates the separation of powers doctrine.213  In his view, courts mustexercise the power to develop the common law more independently.214 This argument, although forcefully made, fails for two reasons.  First,although courts may have followed the Restatement (Second) in manycases, they actually have not delegated their authority to the ALI.  No courthas committed itself to following whatever rules the Restatement (Second)may contain. 215    Instead, courts consider the rules one at a time.  Adoptingone *535 section does not bind them to follow another. The Pennsylvaniacourts may adopt section 87(2),216  but still reject section 15(1)(b).217 Second, Judge Simmons’s argument, if taken to its logical extreme,suggests that courts cannot follow any secondary sources when formulatinglegal rules.  Yet, judges traditionally have consulted a wide variety ofsecondary sources when deciding cases.  They often cite law reviewarticles, legal encyclopedias, treatises, dictionaries, and so forth.  Thesesources can further their understanding of existing law.  They also enablejudges to see criticisms of the law that precedents alone might not supply.For these reasons, a ban on consulting secondary sources has never existedand would have deleterious consequences. B. Policy 
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218 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, § 4.7, at 104 (3d ed.1986) (“Economic analysis reveals no grounds other than fraud, incapacity, andduress...for allowing a party to repudiate the bargain that he made in entering intothe contract.”).219 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153  (1981). 
Even if deferring to the Restatement (Second) does not violate any law,the question remains whether courts should engage in the practice as amatter of policy.  A simple utilitarian analysis suggests that the kind ofdeference seen in the survey has both advantages and disadvantages.  Thefollowing discussion considers the potential costs and benefits of thepractice and concludes that the benefits generally outweigh the costs. 1. Potential Costs of Deference When a court makes a new rule by simply deferring to the Restatement(Second), it risks incurring two important costs.  First, the court mightadopt a rule that does not achieve all of the goals that the court thinksdesirable.  Second, to the extent that deferring to the Restatement (Second)changes the law, the court risks upsetting settled expectations. a. Adopting Inappropriate Rules The substance of contract law makes a difference.  Some rules maypromote economic efficiency better than others.  Some rules may balancethe need for certainty with the need for flexibility better than others.  Stillother rules may conform more closely to customary business practices.  Increating common law rules, courts generally are free to decide what goalsthe rules should achieve.  When a court defers to the Restatement (Second),however, the rule it selects may not accomplish the ends that the courtconsiders important. A court, for instance, may believe that the law should strive almostexclusively to promote economic efficiency.  The court also may believethat efficiency requires enforcement of any contracts not induced by fraud,incapacity, or duress.218  Accordingly, if the court were creating its ownrules, it *536 would not permit a party to void a contract based on unilateralmistake. Yet, if the court simply defers to section 153, it would adopt acontrary rule.219  Deference to the Restatement (Second), accordingly,would come at a cost. A court would adopt a rule that it considersinappropriate. Several factors, however, mitigate this cost.  First, the ALI has a fairlymainstream orientation.  Its members consist of lawyers, law professors,and judges who mostly have the same vision of contract law as the judges
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220 See supra note 54 and  accompanying text.221 See Simmons, supra note 211, at 86-88. Judge Simmons objects to deferenceto the ALI partly because he believes that the ALI has biases that will prevent itfrom choosing appropriate rules. He no tes that most of its members have affiliationswith elite Ivy League law schools, and  thus may not see issues in the same light asthe general public. See id. at 86-87. He also notes that “[t]here are no sociologists,economists, accountants, political scientists, bankers, stockbrokers, insuranceexecutives, corporate chief executive officers, engineers, or penologists representedon the ALI Council.” Id . at 88 (citation omitted). Judge Simmons, however, fails torecognize the possibility of making the same observations about many state supremecourt justices. These justices might choose the same rules as those in the Restate-ment (Second) even if the ALI did  not exist. 222 But see James Gordley, European Codes and American Restatements: SomeDifficulties, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 140, 156 (1981) (arguing that “[i]t would be betterto allow courts to settle on rules as they feel it necessary in the interests ofcertainty”). Professor Gordley contends that developing a coherent set of rules allat once involves greater difficulty than creating an individual rule in a single case.See id. The ALI, however, has put in the effort to create a comprehensive set ofrules to govern contracts.
who occupy courts of last resort throughout the states.  Indeed, many ofthese judges belong to the ALI and participate in the formulation of theRestatements. 220    As a result, in most instances, the ALI designs its rulesto achieve nearly the same objectives that courts would want to achieve ifthey were drafting the rules from scratch.221 Second, the ALI’s rules may accomplish courts’ goals even better thanany rules that courts might devise themselves.  The ALI publishes itsRestatements only after years of diligent work by academics and lawyerswidely acknowledged as experts in their fields.  It requires every commentin every section to contain illustrations and thus insures that any rulesstated actually will produce clear results.  Courts simply do not have thetime or resources to devote a comparable effort to creating or revisingrules.222 Third, any errors that courts make by deferring to the Restatement(Second) probably will have only minor consequences.  Some contractualrules may be better than others, but the difference often does not mattermuch.  Unlike tort liability, which often governs the rights of involuntaryparticipants, contractual liability generally is voluntary.  Parties usually canchoose whether to enter into contracts, and if so, on what terms they wishthe contract to proceed.  Accordingly, parties usually can work aroundcontracts rules that do not fit their needs.  In many cases, therefore,
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223 This statement requires some qualification. Although parties may contractaround rules that they do not like in most instances, they may incur additionaltransaction costs. In addition, the choice of the default rule may have distributionalconsequences; it may favor one party, and thus affect what the other party has topay to get around it. See Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice andPolicy, 1992 W is. L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1992); see also Katz, supra note 122, at 1265(questioning whether parties actually will have the knowledge and skill to contractaround legal rules such as section 87(2)). 224 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89.225 See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 488 A.2d 581, 593 (Pa.1985) (citing section 87); Lanci v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 564 A.2d 972, 974-75(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (citing section 153). 226 See Estate  of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 526-27 (Pa.1986) (rejecting section 15).
adopting inappropriate contracts rules will impose only minor burdens onthe parties or society.223 *537 Consider, for example, the new rule in section 89 that, in someinstances, makes promises to modify contracts binding even in the absenceof additional consideration.224  Suppose that a court defers to this rulebecause it appears in the Restatement (Second). This rule need not affectparties who do not like it. A party who does not want to make a bindingpromise to modify a contract has a simple option. He or she simply canrefuse to make such a promise. The rule, accordingly, applies only to thesmall number of people who make promises without receiving consider-ation and then later decide not to keep them. Fourth, even if courts generally defer to the Restatement (Second), theyremain free to disregard any provisions with which they disagree.  ThePennsylvania courts, as noted, have cited sections 87(2) and 153favorably,225  but they have refused to adopt section 15(1)(b).226  Evenjurisdictions like Arizona and the Virgin Islands, which by case law andstatute follow the Restatement (Second) in the absence of contrary law,have the freedom to reject its provisions when necessary. Thus, althoughdeference may cause courts to pick some inappropriate rules, this costseems likely to remain rather small. b. Unsettling Expectations Courts risk imposing another cost when they defer to new rules in theRestatement (Second).  To the extent that they change existing doctrinessignificantly, courts may upset settled expectations.  For example, relyingon the traditional doctrine that courts will not disturb bargains based solely
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on unilateral mistakes, a party may withhold facts from another partyduring negotiations.  If a court later adopts the new rule on unilateralmistakes in section 153 of the Restatement (Second) and rescinds thecontract, its action will surprise the party that did not make the disclosure.Although unsettling expectations does impose a cost on the parties (andperhaps society as a whole), several factors may lessen the blow.  First,many parties to whom the new rules apply do not have a clear understand-ing of the law anyway.  As a result, they do not have expectations that acourt can upset.  For example, few business people know exactly whichkinds of contracts fall within the statute of frauds and which do not.Accordingly, in many instances, in applying section 139 to enforce anunwritten promise, a court will not upset their expectations.  Second, inmany instances, parties’ expectations may accord more closely with thenew rules than traditional contract doctrine.  The new rule in section 89provides a good example. Nonlawyers well *538 might expect that contractmodifications will bind them even absent new consideration. In suchinstances, a court would upset expectations less by adopting the new rulein section 89 than by applying the traditional preexisting duty doctrine. 2. Benefits Deference to the Restatement (Second) in theory may impose somelimited costs.  Yet, at the same time, it also has a number of benefits.  Apolicy or practice of following the Restatement (Second) rules maypromote clarity and uniformity in the law, and conserve judicial resources.Although courts have not mentioned these benefits in their opinions, theymay have influenced their decisions to defer to the new rules considered inthe survey. a. Clarity The ALI, as described above, undertook the project of producing theRestatements specifically to address the difficulty that courts were havingin discerning common law rules from large numbers of precedents.227 Theysought to create an authoritative source that plainly and concretely wouldexpress rules of contracts and other common law subjects. Few wouldcontest that the Restatement (Second) has achieved this goal. It hasstunningly well-drafted rules accompanied by careful explanations andillustrations. When courts adopt these rules, they almost inevitably bringclarity to contract doctrines. 
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228 See Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity:Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 Harv. J. onLegis. 123, 126-30 (1992) (discussing the costs of ambiguity in legal rules).229 See id . at 127-28. 230 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15(1)(b) (1981) ( “reasonable”); id.§ 86 (“injustice”); id. § 87(2) (“reasonably” and “injustice”); id. § 89 (“fair andequitable”); id. § 139 (“reasonably” and “injustice”); id. § 153 (“unconscionable”).
Improving clarity in the law benefits society because uncertainty aboutthe governing legal rule imposes a number of social costs.  Uncertaintyincreases the amount of time that individuals must devote to legal researchand litigation.228  It also causes people to misgauge legal boundaries.229  Without clear contract rules, parties may think contracts are binding whenthey are not, or vice versa.  Merely stating the rules in a clear manner canalleviate these problems. True, sometimes the law favors vagueness.  Legal doctrines often relyon standards such as reasonableness or injustice rather than black-and-white tests.  The Restatement (Second) includes many such standards;indeed, all of the six sections considered in the survey employ one or moreof them. 230    Naturally, a court sometimes will disagree about how thestandards apply to the facts of a particular case.  Yet, even when a sectionof the Restatement (Second) contains a standard, courts still can promotelegal clarity by adopting the section.  Although parties and judges may notknow exactly how the standard applies, they at least will know whichstandard governs.  In this way, *539 even if the new rules considered in thesurvey will not eliminate uncertainty, they will reduce the costs associatedwith it. b. Uniformity The United States has more than fifty jurisdictions that have the powerto create common law rules of contracts.  Because courts in each jurisdic-tion act independently when exercising this authority, they often haveproduced different rules.  As a result, the law of contracts in manyinstances lacks uniformity from one jurisdiction to another.  The rules inone state, put simply, may differ from those in another. Nonuniformity in contract law may cause problems.  As one commenta-tor famously put it, commerce relies heavily on contracts, but “knows
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231 M. D . Chalmers, Codification of M ercantile Law, 19 Law Q. Rev. 10, 17-18(1903) (expressing the need for codification, and hence, unification of commerciallaw in the United States). 232 See James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 1,at 1-5 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing adoption of the U.C.C. and the Uniform Sales Act).233 U.C.C. § 2-102 (1996). 
nothing of [[[s]tate boundaries.”231  A party in one jurisdiction frequentlywill make a contract with a party in another jurisdiction. If the contract lawdiffers between the two jurisdictions, the parties may have difficultydetermining which rule will govern their conduct, and the result maysurprise one party or the other. The desire for uniformity in the law of contracts led to the enactment innearly every jurisdiction of the Uniform Sales Act in the first half of thiscentury and its successor, Article 2 of the U.C.C., in the second half. 232  Article 2, however, has a limited scope; it applies only to “transactions ingoods” and not to contracts involving services or other subject matters.233As a result, much of the law of contracts remains nonuniform throughoutthe different states. Deference to the Restatement (Second) tends to make the law moreuniform.  When a court follows a Restatement (Second) provision, itusually is adopting a rule that other jurisdictions already have followed andmore will accept in the future.  For example, if a court follows the rule laidout in section 153, its rules on unilateral mistakes will match those in effectin at least twenty-two other jurisdictions. Uniformity, despite its benefits, does have a disadvantage.  Sometimesstandardization can become the enemy of progress because it discouragesinnovation.  If courts value having the same rule as other jurisdictions morethan having the best rule possible, they will not experiment in an effort toimprove the law of contracts.  For example, if the California Supreme Courthad not adopted a new rule in Drennan v. Star Paving Co. section 87(2)might not have come to exist.  To the extent that these rules reflect betterpolicies than their predecessors, society might have suffered. This concern does not appear especially grave. No courts have boundthemselves to follow the Restatement (Second). Courts defer when theyhave no particular objections to the Restatement (Second)’s rules. If a courtever *540 did think another rule preferable, it could refuse to follow theALI’s recommendation. Eight of the cases considered in the survey, after
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234 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform chs. 3-5(1985) (explaining the extent and consequences of the case load expansion andsuggesting “institutional proposals” to deal with the problem); Thomas E. Baker,A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: “Neither out Far Nor in Deep,” 45Case W. Res. L. Rev. 705, 715-18, 741 (1995) (discussing the prominent role statecourts, in comparison to federal courts, will play in preparing for the influx in casesand appeals filed); Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts:Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 Tex. L. Rev.1485, 1487-91 (1995) (describing the problem of an increased case load at theappellate level).235 See supra note 88 and  accompanying text.
all, took exactly that course of action. Thus, even though widespreaddeference to the Restatement (Second) generally will promote uniformity,it certainly does not make experimentation impossible. c. Conservation of Judicial Resources Many observers have remarked in recent years that both state andfederal courts, especially at the appellate level, have too much work.234Time saving measures that do not adversely affect the quality of a judge’swork may free up judicial resources for other tasks. For example, if courtsspend less time on contracts cases, they may have more time for criminalcases and so forth. The Restatement (Second) may help in this regard. By deferring to the Restatement (Second) when determining theapplicable law, courts have saved time and effort in deciding contractscases.  Indeed, this benefit probably explains better than anything else whymost courts in the survey actually cited and applied the new rules insections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89, 139, and 153. Courts in most casesappeared to want a quick answer to the question before them. Because theRestatement (Second) supplied a convenient statement of the rule ofcontract law, most of the opinions required only a paragraph to decide theissues that they confronted. In the aggregate, with more than twenty-fourthousand cases citing the Restatement (Second)’s formulation of therules,235  this benefit gradually adds up to a considerable savings of judicialresources. Simplifying the task of judicial decisionmaking does have limits.Judges could rule easily if they merely had to flip a coin to determinewhether the plaintiff or the defendant should win.  Deference to theRestatement (Second), however, not only lessens the burden on courts, butin most instances also improves the quality of the contracts doctrine. 
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236 Some commentators have argued, however, that some rules or doctrinescannot fit comfortably with others. See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, T he Death of Contract61-65, 72 (1973) (arguing that the promissory estoppel doctrine fundamentallyconflicts with the consideration doctrine).
The improvement takes two forms.  First, from a technical standpoint,the Restatement (Second) contains carefully worded and superbly draftedrules.  For the most part, the rules also fit together in a coherent manner. 236For instance, the sections on offer and acceptance mesh with thoseaddressing mistake, misrepresentation, and so forth. As long as a courtagrees with the outcome of the rule, the court generally will do better toadopt it than to try to rephrase it. The ALI, after all, studied the rules foryears before finally *541 promulgating them. Courts should not seek toduplicate this effort when they simply can follow the pertinent sections. Second, from a substantive standpoint, the rules generally promotemainstream goals in contracts law.  Although judges may disagree withsome of the rules on substantive grounds, they should keep in mind thelimitations of their judgment.  A large number of legal experts have devoteddecades to formulating the rules in the Restatement (Second).  As a result,they probably have chosen better substantive rules than anyone couldexpect to devise without expending comparable effort to weighingcompeting policy objectives. C. Deference in Perspective The foregoing discussion strongly supports judicial deference to theRestatement (Second).  It argues that deference generally violates no legalprinciples, and that it has limited social costs and substantial benefits.  Thisconclusion may strike some readers as controversial because it does not fitclosely with the traditional model of common law development.  Courts arenot slowly developing and refining the rules of contracts law in anincremental manner.  Instead, they simply are choosing a rule from a bookand then applying it.  Two observations, however, may help to put myconclusion in perspective. First, the practice of deferring to the Restatement (Second) has becomeextraordinarily widespread.  Several hundred courts have deferred to the sixnew rules considered in the survey alone.  Thousands of decisions havecited and followed other rules.  Any assertion that courts should not orlegally cannot defer, as so many already have done, would imply thatalmost all of the judiciary, acting independently or in concert, are doingsomething fundamentally wrong. 
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237 Whether courts should exercise comparable deference to other ALIpublications, such as the Restatement (Second) of Torts, remains an open questionbecause the answer involves different considerations. Tort law differs fromcontracts law in many ways. For example, although contracts law often merelyestablishes procedures and default rules for people who want to make contracts, tortlaw governs the conduct of everyone, whether or not they want to be tortfeasors ortort victims. As a result, the substance of tort law may matter more than thesubstance of contracts law, and courts may not wish to turn over their authority soeasily. 238 See infra Appendix.239 See infra Appendix. 240 See infra Appendix.
Second, any objection to courts’ actions would cast in doubt the basicplan of the Restatement (Second).  The ALI created this work not as anacademic exercise, but instead because they wanted to devise clear rulesthat courts could understand and follow.  The ALI did not expect courts totrouble themselves very much with policy considerations in adopting therules.  Instead, the ALI wanted deference, and they achieved it. These two observations, needless to say, do not demonstrate that courtshave acted properly.  The foregoing discussion attempts to do that.  Instead,these observations merely serve to show that what at first might seemsurprising, if not shocking, in fact should be less controversial than thealternative.  The status quo in the common law development of contractsdoctrine--deference to the ALI--although different from the historicalmodel, should not seem so peculiar.237 *542 A. Concluding Prediction The survey found that the vast majority of courts that have cited the newrules in sections 15, 86, 87, 89, 139, and 153 have followed them.238  Outof 241 cases, only eight decisions cited the new rules in a negative manner.Besides showing that courts generally defer to the Restatement (Second),what does this observation suggest about the status of these particularsections? The survey does not prove that courts in every jurisdiction or even amajority of jurisdictions have adopted the new rules.  Most states simplyhave not yet had the opportunity to consider the six sections surveyed.  Forexample, although over eighty cases have cited section 153 on the subjectof unilateral mistake, there were only forty-six state cases from onlytwenty-four different states (including the District of Columbia).239  Evenfewer jurisdictions have produced decisions citing the other five sections.240
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241 See G ilmore, supra note 236, at 87. 242 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980’s:The Top Ten, 41  Case W. Res. L. Rev. 203, 221-22 (1990); Amy H. Kastely, Cogsor Cyborgs?: Blasphemy and Irony in Contract Theories, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 132,135-42 (1995).243 See infra Appendix.
The methodology of the survey also may have exaggerated to someextent the popularity of the new rules.  Many of the decisions citing therules mentioned them only in dicta.  In addition, courts that have disagreedwith the sections may have decided not to cite them.  For example, courtsthat do not believe that past consideration can suffice as a basis forenforcement simply may state that rule without bothering to say anythingabout section 86. Despite these limitations, the observation that 233 out of 241 cases citedthe new rules favorably leads me to predict that most courts will adoptthese rules if presented with issues to which they apply.  Making predic-tions of this sort, of course, involves some hazards.  Professor GrantGilmore, for example, famously predicted that promissory estoppel wouldswallow up the consideration doctrine,241  and that forecast has not provedaccurate.242  Yet, the results of the survey make continued acceptance ofsections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89, 139, and 153 seem quite likely. When these six sections first appeared in the Restatement (Second), theyall stated new rules that had little support in the cases and that contradictedtraditional statements of contracts doctrine.  The survey shows that largenumbers of courts nonetheless have been adopting the rules.243  Nothing hashappened that might bring that trend to an end; courts, on the whole, havenot established substantial precedent for rejecting the rules. On thecontrary, a large body of cases--233 and counting--now supports these sixrules. These precedents create additional momentum, making the movementtoward adopting the sections all the more difficult to stop. I undertook the survey to help answer the question whether the newrules stated in sections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89, 139, and 153 accuratelystate the law. The survey shows that most of the rules already have gaineda strong foothold in the precedent. The number of favorable decisionsalmost *543 certainly will grow as time proceeds. To the extent that astatement of the law represents a prediction about what rule a court will
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244 Cf. Holmes, supra note 48, at 457 (describing law as the study of “theprediction of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts”).
follow when confronted with a set of facts,244 then the rules appear toexpress the law of contracts with admirable accuracy. Appendix This Appendix lists the cases citing sections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89,139, and 153. Citations to federal decisions follow the citations to statedecisions (including those from the District of Columbia). Section 15(1)(b) Alaska Pappert v. Sargent, 847 P.2d 66, 70 (Alaska 1993). District of Columbia Butler v. Harrison, 578 A.2d 1098, 1100-01 (D.C. 1990). Massachusetts Krasner v. Berk, 319 N.E.2d 897, 898, 900 (Mass. 1974). Farnum v. Silvano, 540 N.E.2d 202, 204-05 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989). New York Ortelere v. Teachers’ Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460, 465 (N.Y. 1969). In re Estate of Obermeier, 540 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (Weiss, J.,dissenting). Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Group, 519 N.Y.S.2d 973, 978 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). Tomasino v. New York State Employees’ Retirement Sys., 448 N.Y.S.2d 819, 822 (N.Y.App. Div.) (Weiss, J., dissenting), aff’d, 440 N.E.2d 1330 (N.Y. 1982). Pentinen v. New York State Employees’ Retirement Sys., 401 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (N.Y.App. Div. 1978). Keith v. New York State Teachers’ Retirement Sys., 362 N.Y.S.2d 231, 236 (N.Y. App.Div. 1974). In re Estate of ACN, 509 N.Y.S.2d 966, 970 (Sur. Ct. 1986). In re Estate of Gebauer, 361 N.Y.S.2d 539, 544-45 (Sur. Ct. 1974). Oregon Gore v. Gadd, 522 P.2d 212, 213 n.1 (Or. 1974) (in banc). *544 Pennsylvania Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 526, 530 (Pa. 1986). Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 481 A.2d 981, 984-86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).Tennessee In re Ellis, 822 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). Texas Smith v. Christley, 755 S.W.2d 525, 532-33 (Tex. App. 1988). Nohra v. Evans, 509 S.W.2d 648, 654-55 (Tex. App. 1974). Wisconsin Hauer v. Union State Bank, 532 N.W.2d 456, 461 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). Federal FDIC v. Ohlson, 659 F. Supp. 490, 492 n.3 (N.D. Iowa 1987). 
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In re Hall, 188 B.R. 476, 485 n.12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995). In re Britton, 66 B.R. 572, 577 n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986). 
Section 86 Arizona Realty Assocs. v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 738 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). California Knight v. Board of Admin. of Pub. Employees’ Retirement Sys., 273 Cal. Rptr. 120, 145n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). Missouri McMurry v. Magnusson, 849 S.W.2d 619, 623 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). Federal First Nat’l Bankshares, Inc. v. Geisel, 853 F. Supp. 1344, 1357 (D. Kan. 1994). 
Section 87(2) Colorado Centric-Jones Co. v. Hufnagel, 848 P.2d 942, 956 n.4 (Colo. 1993) (en banc) (Vollack,J., dissenting in part). *545 Idaho Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 582 P.2d 1074, 1081 n.2 (Idaho 1978) (Bistline, J., concurring).Iowa Levien Leasing Co. v. Dickey Co., 380 N.W.2d 748, 754 n.3 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985). Maryland Pavel Enters., Inc. v. A. S. Johnson Co., 674 A.2d 521, 529 & n.17 (Md. 1996). Massachusetts Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat’l Bank v. Varadian, 647 N.E.2d 1174, 1178 (Mass. 1995).Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E. F. Hauserman Co., 384 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Mass. 1978). Cannavino & Shea, Inc. v. Water Works Supply Corp., 280 N.E.2d 147, 149 (Mass.1972). Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E. F. Hauserman Co., 374 N.E.2d 306, 311 n.3 (Mass. App.Ct.), aff’d, 384 N.E.2d 176 (Mass. 1978). Missouri Cleveland v. High Country Fashions, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).New Mexico Strata Prod. Co. v. Mercury Exploration Co., 916 P.2d 822, 829 (N.M. 1996). New York De Kovessey v. Coronet Properties Co., 508 N.E.2d 652, 655 (N.Y. 1987). Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen, J.,dissenting). Pennsylvania Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 488 A.2d 581, 593 (Pa. 1985) (Hutchinson,J., concurring). Washington Arango Constr. Co. v. Success Roofing, Inc., 730 P.2d 720, 725 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).Ferrer v. Taft Structurals, Inc., 587 P.2d 177, 179 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). *546 Federal Dugan & Meyers Constr. Co v. Worthington Pump Corp., 746 F.2d 1166, 1174 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985). 
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Dankrag, Ltd. v. International Terminal Operating Co., 729 F. Supp. 360, 364 n.3(S.D.N.Y. 1990). Koro Co. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 568 F. Supp. 280, 285 (D.D.C. 1983). Cayuga Constr. Corp. v. Vanco Eng’g Co., 423 F. Supp. 1182, 1185 (W.D. Pa. 1976).In re Waldron, 36 B.R. 633, 636 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984). Hoel-Steffen Constr. Co. v. United States, 684 F.2d 843, 848 (Ct. Cl. 1982). 
Section 89 Connecticut General Elec. Supply Co. v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 441 A.2d 581, 592 (Conn.1981). Illinois Greenberg v. Mallick Management, Inc., 527 N.E.2d 943, 949 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). Iowa F. S. Credit Corp. v. Shear Elevator, Inc., 377 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Iowa 1985). In re Guardianship of Collins, 327 N.W.2d 230, 233 (Iowa 1982). Quigley v. Wilson, 474 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Iowa Ct. App.), aff’d, 474 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa1991). Massachusetts Telecon, Inc. v. Emerson-Swan, Inc., 461 N.E.2d 1227, 1228 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984). Michigan Scholz v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 468 N.W.2d 845, 854 (Mich. 1991) (Levin, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part). New Hampshire Gintzler v. Melnick, 364 A.2d 637, 640 (N.H. 1976). New York Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen, J.,dissenting). *547 North Carolina Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 293 S.E.2d 749, 756 (N.C. 1982). Ohio Smaldino v. Larsick, 630 N.E.2d 408, 413 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). Rhode Island Salo Landscape & Constr. Co. v. Liberty Elec. Co., 376 A.2d 1379, 1381 n.1 (R.I.1977). Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 636-37 & n.3 (R.I. 1974). Wyoming Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 219 (Wyo. 1994). Federal McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Washington Capital Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 94 (5th Cir.),opinion corrected on denial of reh’g, 70 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1995). Autotrol Corp. v. Continental Water Sys. Corp., 918 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1990). Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 793 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986). United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 778 F.2d 810, 816-18 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Billman v. V. I. Equities Corp., 743 F.2d 1021, 1024 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1984). Coyer v. Watt, 720 F.2d 626, 629 (10th Cir. 1983). Lowey v. Watt, 684 F.2d 957, 968-70 & n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Section 139 
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Arkansas Hoffius v. Maestri, 786 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990). California Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc., 702 P.2d 212, 221 (Cal. 1985) (in banc). Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 345, 350-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). Colorado Kiely v. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764, 768-770 (Colo. 1983) (en banc). Chidester v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Assocs., 859 P.2d 222, 225 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992). Nicol v. Nelson, 776 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989). Tripp v. Shelter Research, Inc., 729 P.2d 1024, 1025-26 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986). *548 St. Germain v. Boshouwers, 646 P.2d 952, 954 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982), rev’d inpart, 670 P.2d 764 (1983). Hawaii McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177, 181 (Haw. 1970). Hawaiian Trust Co. v. Cowan, 663 P.2d 634, 637 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983). Lee v. Kimura, 634 P.2d 1043, 1048 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981). Indiana Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Kopani, 514 N.E.2d 840, 844-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). Iowa Peterson v. Petersen, 355 N.W.2d 26, 27 (Iowa 1984). Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339, 342-44 (Iowa 1979). Kansas Progress Enters., Inc. v. Litwin Corp., 589 P.2d 583, 588 (Kan. 1979). Walker v. Ireton, 559 P.2d 340, 345-46 (Kan. 1977). Maine Stearns v. Emery-Waterhouse Co., 596 A.2d 72, 74-75 (Me. 1991). Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1130 n.6 (Me. 1978). Maryland Pavel Enters., Inc. v. A. S. Johnson Co., 674 A.2d 521, 532 n.28 (Md. 1996). Snyder v. Snyder, 558 A.2d 412, 417 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989). Michigan Powers v. Peoples Community Hosp. Auth., 465 N.W.2d 566, 567 (Mich. 1991) (Levin,J., dissenting). Missouri Davis v. Nelson, 880 S.W.2d 658, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). McCoy v. Spelman Mem’l Hosp., 845 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). Geisinger v. A & B Farms, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 96, 99-100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). New York Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245, 1247, 1251 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen, J.,dissenting). *549 Klein v. Jamor Purveyors, Inc., 489 N.Y.S.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 471 N.Y.S.2d 299, 302 (N.Y. App.Div.), aff’d, 472 N.E.2d 992, 996 (1984). Swerdloff v. Mobil Oil Corp., 427 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). Healy v. Brotman, 409 N.Y.S.2d 72, 75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978). North Carolina Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 293 S.E.2d 749, 759 (N.C. 1982). 
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